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While many political scientists and diplomatic historians see the Bush presidency as a distinctive epoch
in American foreign policy, we argue that there was no Bush Doctrine in foreign economic policy.
The Bush administration sought to advance a free trade agenda but could not avoid the use of protectionist
measures at home -- just like its predecessors.  It foreswore bailouts of financially-distressed developing
countries yet ultimately yielded to the perceived necessity of lending assistance -- just like its predecessors.
Not unlike previous presidents, President Bush also maintained a stance of benign neglect toward
the country's current account deficit.  These continuities reflect long-standing structures and deeply
embedded interests that the administration found impossible to resist.
We see the next administration as having to address many of the same problems subject to the same
constraints.  The trade policy agenda will evolve slowly, with questions about the viability of multilateral
liberalization under the WTO and the degree to which labor and environmental conditions can be included
in trade agreements.  Policy toward China will continue to confront difficult choices: even if it succeeds
in pressuring the country to reduce its accumulation of dollar reserves, thereby easing the current account
imbalance with the United States, this may only imply a more difficult market for U.S. Treasury debt
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1.  Introduction 
 
In many areas of foreign policy, the Bush doctrine marks a sharp break with the 
approaches of earlier administrations.  At first glance this seems true of the Bush 
Administration’s foreign economic policy as well.
2  Not unlike the administration of 
Ronald Reagan before them, the administration of George W. Bush brought to 
Washington a powerful ideology – that of limited government – to inform and shape 
policy decisions.  This staunchly noninterventionist, free-market approach led candidate 
Bush to campaign as a supporter of free trade.  It led his inner circle to conclude that 
intervening in foreign exchange markets, however acceptable for Europe or Japan, was 
inappropriate for the United States.  Bush and his advisors opposed using government 
influence and taxpayer money to intervene in emerging markets suffering financial crises, 
bilaterally and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  They were skeptical that 
official assistance, whether doled our directly or through the World Bank, could be an 
agent of change in less developed countries. 
  In the event, the new administration had little opportunity to pursue this vision 
before 9/11 reshaped its foreign economic policies.  The idea that government should be 
limited rested uncomfortably with this reminder of the paramount responsibility of any 
administration for national security.  The wish to limit discretionary trade policy and 
foreign aid butted up against the realization that these could be devices for supporting 
allies in the war on terror.  The fallout from 9/11 meant that a tremendous amount of U.S. 
                                                 
2 As Richard Cooper (1972) famously pointed out, economic policy is foreign policy.     3
Treasury resources were diverted toward terrorism-related issues such as the economic 
and financial reconstruction of Iraq.
3   
  At the systemic level, powerful interests and long-standing structures also forced 
the administration to modify its initial vision.  Holding to free trade threatened to 
antagonize special interests on whose support reelection prospects depended.  Leaving 
Turkey or Argentina to its financial fate might destabilize global financial markets.  
Denying foreign aid to countries with weak governments might contribute to the further 
breakdown of their economic and political systems.  In these and other connections, the 
existence of powerful lobbies and special interests forced the Bush Administration, now 
having to maneuver in the policy arena, to assume a more pragmatic stance.  The 
existence of structures like the World Trade Organization (which constrains the 
president’s trade policy-making options) and international capital markets (which have 
too much destabilizing capacity to be treated with benign neglect) required the 
administration to modify or abandon the more radical elements of its agenda. 
  Reflecting the constraints of these inherited structures and interests, policies 
departed less from those of earlier years than the administration’s initial rhetoric would 
have led one to expect.  Whereas some political scientists and diplomatic historians are 
apt to see the Bush presidency as a distinctive epoch in American foreign policy, we 
therefore argue that there was no Bush Doctrine in international economic policy.   
This analysis leads us to expect continuities with future policy as well.  Neither 
the foreign policy concerns created by 9/11 nor long-standing structural constraints on 
international economic policy making will go away.  In combination they will prevent the 
                                                 
3 As described by Taylor (2007).  Policy toward terrorist financing is a complex story of its own; we do not 
treat it here, partly because the issue is highly specialized, and partly because no one paper can address 
everything.   4
next administration, whatever its identity, from undertaking radical changes to U.S. 
foreign economic policy – much as they constrained the administration of George W. 
Bush.   
    
2.   Trade Policy 
  In trade policy, the Bush administration behaved like almost every other post-
World War II presidential administration: it linked initiatives in this domain to broader 
foreign policy goals, supported the multilateral trading system, and sought trade 
negotiating powers from the Congress to conclude trade agreements.  Also like its 
predecessors, the administration made exceptions to this doctrine by giving temporary 
protection to politically-influential sectors.  Although its approach has some distinctive 
aspects, most notably the energetic pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements, the Bush 
administration does not stand out as distinctive in its trade policy stance. 
  The fundamental reason for these similarities is that the roots of trade policy run 
deep.  The current trade policy framework was established by the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act (RTAA) that came into existence during the Roosevelt administration at 
a time when world trade had collapsed due to protectionism and the Great Depression.
4  
Congress delegated some of its constitutional powers over trade policy to the executive 
branch.
5  The RTAA was controversial because it marked a sharp break from America’s 
protectionist, isolationist past, as reflected in the infamous Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930.  
After World War II, the RTAA was infused with an important, bipartisan foreign policy 
rationale:  the strengthening of Western Europe and the fight against communism.  The 
                                                 
4  On the importance of the RTAA, see Irwin (1998). 
5 Prior to 1974, those agreements did not even require Congressional approval; starting in 1974, Congress 
must approve any agreement (by a majority vote in each chamber) but cannot amend the agreement.     5
logic was straightforward: expanding world trade would promote economic recovery in 
Western Europe and secure democracy, enabling the region to resist Soviet communism 
and thereby promote U.S. national security interests. 
  As a result Congress rarely allowed the president’s trade negotiating authority to 
lapse.  A bipartisan consensus on the importance of open trade policies – however frayed 
it was at times – endured throughout the post World War II period and ensured policy 
continuity through Republican and Democratic administrations and Congresses.  It 
enabled the United States to play a leading role in creating the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), participate in several GATT trade negotiating rounds, and 
support the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.   
  This framework leaves a presidential administration little scope for developing a 
distinctive trade policy.  Every president since Franklin Roosevelt has believed that the 
open world trading system and trade liberalization are fundamentally in America’s 
economic and foreign policy interest.  Every president has sought Congressional 
authority to negotiate trade agreements to open up foreign markets to U.S. exports in 
exchange for a reduction in U.S. trade barriers.  And every president has made special 
accommodation for trade-affected interests at home. 
President Bush was exceptional only in the degree to which he spoke out clearly 
and unambiguously in favor of free trade.  Most presidents have tempered their 
endorsement of free trade with the qualification that trade must be “fair” and that 
adequate protection must be given to displaced workers or industries injured by imports.  
With Bush there was no wishy-washy rhetoric about “fair trade” to which even President   6
Ronald Reagan had succumbed.  All recent presidents have rejected “protectionism,” but 
Bush was emphatic and without qualification at the outset of his term.
6   
During the 2000 election campaign, candidate Bush took a strong stand in favor 
of the economic, political, and moral benefits of free trade.  Four months into his 
administration, the new president linked free trade to freedom more generally:  “Free 
trade supports and sustains freedom in all its forms . . . . When we open trade, we open 
minds.” (May 29, 2001).  He argued that free trade is an uplifting policy that not only 
spreads prosperity and hope to where both are in short supply, but that it would ultimately 
lead to demands for political freedom as well.  “Free trade is also a proven strategy for 
building global prosperity and adding to the momentum of political freedom . . . . And 
greater freedom for commerce across the borders eventually leads to greater freedom for 
citizens within the borders.” (August 12, 2002).   
  In a campaign speech in Miami in 2000, Bush outlined his trade agenda:  secure 
trade negotiating authority from Congress and negotiate agreements to establish free 
trade from Canada to the Cape of Good Horn.
7  Once in office the Bush administration 
                                                 
6 In early statements of administration policy, Bush never mentioned the word “fair trade.”  For example, in 
March 2001, at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan, Bush stated:  “This administration 
will always speak for American interests, but free and open trade is in our national interest. The world will 
know this, that I strongly and my administration strongly supports free trade.”  However, later in the 
administration the rhetoric of fair trade had crept in.  In his 2004 State of the Union message, Bush stated:  
“My administration is promoting free and fair trade to open up new markets for America's entrepreneurs 
and manufacturers and farmers, to create jobs for American workers.” 
7  “If the United States cannot offer new trade with the nations of Latin America, they will find it elsewhere 
-- as they are doing already in new agreements with the European Union. In the last few years, Mexico 
signed a trade agreement with the Europeans, while Canada has a new trade pact with Chile.  All of this 
while, in Washington, time has been lost. European businesses and consumers are benefiting -- ours are 
not.  I don't fault our European friends for making these deals. We dropped the ball, and they're running 
with it. But we must get back into the game, and here is how I propose to do it...First, I will secure fast-
track authority -- the ability to pass or reject trade agreements without amendment. Without it, as we have 
seen, America is slow to move, and other nations are unwilling to negotiate with us seriously.  . . . Our goal 
will be free trade agreements with all the nations of Latin America. We can do so in cooperation with our 
NAFTA partners. We should do so with Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, the anchor states of Mercosur.   7
proceeded exactly as promised.  The first step was to secure “trade promotion authority” 
(previously known as fast track authority) in order to reach bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements to reduce trade barriers.  Without trade promotion authority (TPA), the 
president could negotiate with other countries about trade barriers, but he could not do so 
credibly, thus reducing the probability of reaching an agreement.
8  Congressional 
permission for the executive branch to conclude trade agreements had lapsed in 1997.  
The Clinton administration had used fast track authority to push through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of trade agreements 
in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
9  Although both measures, particularly NAFTA, were 
controversial, the Clinton administration succeeded, but the political price was steep.  
Suffering from trade fatigue, Congress had declined the administration’s request to renew 
its trade negotiating authority. 
  Once in office, Bush’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Robert Zoellick, asked 
Congress for TPA and initiated a broad trade agenda based on multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements.  As TPA legislation was being formulated, USTR had to prepare for a 
WTO ministerial meeting in November 2001.  The previous WTO ministerial meeting in 
Seattle in 1999 had been marred by violent protests outside the convention, while a sharp 
split between developing and developed countries erased any chance of a new trade 
round.  The 2001 ministerial in Doha, Qatar promised to be equally fractious, and few 
expected it to succeed.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, with such vast economic potential, and our relations must 
reflect this.  We will also work toward free trade with the smaller nations of Central America and the 
Caribbean. We must be flexible because one-size-fits-all negotiations are not always the answer.  But the 
ultimate goal will remain constant ... free trade from northernmost Canada to the tip of Cape Horn.”  
Remarks in Miami on 27 August 2000. 
8  See Destler (1997). 
9 These trade initiatives had been largely negotiated under the first Bush administration, but it fell upon the 
Clinton administration to secure their passage through Congress.     8
Then 9/11 intervened.  Other countries rallied around the United States and 
sought to ensure that world trade would be kept open and free despite the terrorist attacks 
and the possibility of a global recession.  Yet many developing countries remained 
suspicious of a new trade round because the obligations that they had undertaken in the 
Uruguay Round were still fresh in mind.  The concerns of developing countries were 
eased by the promise that the new round would focus on economic development.
10  This 
helped to inject new life into the WTO and enabled the launch of the new multilateral 
trade negotiations.   
  Much in the way that the Truman administration had sought to link early trade 
liberalization with foreign policy goals, the Bush administration enlisted the war on terror 
as part of a new push for trade liberalization.  Nine days after 9/11, Zoellick published an 
op-ed in the Washington Post entitled “Countering Terror with Trade” in which he 
argued that  
“[e]conomic strength -- at home and abroad -- is the foundation of America's hard 
and soft power. Earlier enemies learned that America is the arsenal of democracy; 
today's enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for freedom, 
opportunity and development. To that end, U.S. leadership in promoting the 
international economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about more than 
economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle. 
. . . . Congress now needs to send an unmistakable signal to the world that the 
United States is committed to global leadership of openness and understands that 
the staying power of our new coalition depends on economic growth and hope. . . 
. Congress needs to enact U.S. trade promotion authority so America can 
negotiate agreements that advance the causes of openness, development and 
growth. It is a sad irony that just as the old world of bipolar blocs faded into 
history and the new world of globalization fast-forwarded, the United States let its 
trade promotion authority lapse.”  
 
   The prospect of a new negotiating round at the WTO was just what the Bush 
administration needed to convince Congress that it required TPA.  In December 2001 the 
                                                 
10 Hence the name the Doha Development Round.   9
Republican House of Representatives passed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2001 by the very partisan vote of 215 to 214, with Republicans voting 194-24 in 
favor and Democrats voting 188-20 against.  This sharply partisan vote was a worrisome 
signal of future difficulties; previous approvals had often come with some reluctance on 
the part of Democrats, but the TPA votes were extremely divisive (Shapiro 2006).
 11   
Thus, 9/11 helped create an environment that facilitated the granting of TPA and 
the launching of the Doha Round.  But after moving more quickly than most 
administrations on trade policy, the Bush administration discovered that implementing 
freer trade was more difficult than anticipated.  While TPA cleared a path for 
commencing the Doha Round, it soon became clear that the negotiations would not be 
easy.  Administration officials hopeful for an “early harvest” from the Doha round were 
powerless to produce such a result without a willingness on the part of the European 
Union to compromise on its agricultural subsidies or developing countries to embrace 
domestic trade reforms.
12 
The administration also felt tensions when using trade policy as a tool in the war 
on terror, discovering that it could not ignore domestic political considerations in using 
trade concessions to help allies.  Shortly after 9/11, President Pervez Musharraf of 
Pakistan requested the suspension of tariff and quota on Pakistan’s exports of textiles and 
                                                 
11 The Senate approved TPA in the context of a vote on Andean trade preferences in May 2002, and 
negotiating authority finally cleared Congress in July 2002.  TPA was approved for three years with a 
possible two year extension at the request of the president.   
12 Indeed, the compromise reached at Doha to label the round a “development” round may have sown the 
seeds of future discord.  Many developing countries expected non-reciprocal market access to be granted to 
them by developed countries.  Developing countries believed they were owed such treatment as a result of 
imbalances in the Uruguay Round and promises at Doha, but developed countries held fast to demands for 
reciprocity.  In fact, both the 2003 WTO ministerial in Cancun and the 2005 ministerial in Hong Kong 
ended in failure and a key deadline in late 2006 was missed, suggesting that the Doha round will have to be 
completed in the next administration.     10
apparel to the United States in an effort to lift its economy.
13  After debate within the 
administration, Commerce Department officials informed Pakistan’s representatives that 
the United States would be unable to grant trade concessions aside from some temporary 
swing quotas.  Pressure from the domestic textile and apparel industry had blocked any 
expansion of imports.  In the event, Pakistan’s textile exports to the United States actually 
fell sharply in the months after 9/11 because of a sharp rise in insurance premiums, 
costing Pakistan over a billion dollars in exports.
14     
Still, Zoellick envisioned using the prospect of bilateral trade agreements to assist 
allies in the war effort, denying potential trade benefits to countries that did not cooperate 
in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The most notable example was the successful pursuit 
of a free trade agreement with Australia (which sent troops to Iraq) and the rejection of 
any such agreement with New Zealand (which did not support the war). 
A more ambitious goal was bringing freer trade to the Middle East.  The United 
States has long encouraged the countries of the Middle East to diversify away from oil 
and to take steps to unleash the economic growth that brings about shared prosperity.  
The president had always stressed freer trade could be a catalyst for broader political and 
economic changes that would enhance the cause of liberty and democratization.  In May 
2003 he announced a plan of graduated steps for Middle Eastern nations to increase trade 
and investment with the United States and others in the world economy.  The Bush 
administration identified free trade agreements as one means to this end, the hope being 
                                                 
13 Both the European Union and Turkey had done so. 
14  According to Franklin Foer (2002), the reason for the rejection of Pakistan was that Republicans decided 
that they wanted to pass TPA without Democratic support to show the business lobbies that reliably pro-
trade Democrats were not trustworthy on the issue.  To get a majority, Ways and Means Chairman Bill 
Thomas needed to woo protectionist Republicans to the bill with promises that key industries in their 
districts would be protected. House Republican leaders secured the deciding vote of Robin Hayes (R-NC) 
by promising not to increase quotas on Pakistani textile imports.   11
that economic changes could help bring about political and societal change that increase 
freedom and reduce the risk of terrorism.   
Aside from Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, the administration has 
found few willing partners in the region.  Countries marked by political and economic 
repression – such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran, among others – remain 
relatively closed to the world economy.  Their leaders do not want to unleash forces 
associated with the rough and tumble of increased trade and foreign investment.
15    
The administration also discovered that implementing free trade policies at home 
was not simple either.  This was evident in three areas:  steel, agriculture, and China.   
 In any election campaign there is the temptation to promise specific trade relief to 
constituencies that are said to be suffering from import competition.  Campaigning at a 
West Virginia steel mill, then-vice presidential candidate Dick Cheney told workers:  “If 
our trading partners violate our trade laws, we will respond swiftly and firmly. There 
should be no more looking the other way so that politics can triumph over principles.”
16   
In itself this promise was nothing out of the ordinary.  Every administration since 
Lyndon Johnson had promised and delivered special trade protection to the steel industry 
– with the notable exception of the Clinton administration during the steel price decline 
following the Asian financial crisis.
17  But Cheney’s commitment was striking, given the 
administration’s free trade stance. 
                                                 
15   For an assessment of the role of trade and political reform in the Middle East, see Momani (2007). 
16  The origin of this promise is purported to be the president’s campaign adviser, Karl Rove, who 
calculated that West Virginia was a close enough call for the Republicans that such a pledge might tip the 
state’s electoral votes to the Republicans.  In fact, Rove’s position may have been vindicated because Bush 
won West Virginia, the first time a Republican had done so since 1984 and only the fourth time in eighteen 
elections since 1932, and the election would have been lost without that state. 
17 Industries are always free to petition for antidumping and countervailing duties in an administrative 
process that is not subject to presidential discretion.  But historically, the steel industry has been politically 
powerful enough to merit executive trade actions to limit imports.  President Johnson and Nixon negotiated   12
After the election, the Cheney promise on steel came due.  In June 2001, the Bush 
administration took the unusual step of initiating a Section 201 “escape clause” case on 
behalf of the steel industry.
18  This was the first time that a Section 201 case had been 
initiated by the executive branch and signaled the degree to which the administration 
supported the imposition of import restrictions.  The problem for the independent, quasi-
judicial International Trade Commission (ITC), which had to interpret the petition in light 
of the Congressional statute, was that the steel import surge occurred in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, whereas the case required the consideration of imports 
from 1999-2000, when they had dropped off considerably.
19  With the Bush 
administration having sent the strongest possible signal by initiating the 201 case, the ITC 
ruled, in many but not all categories of goods, that the U.S. industry had been injured by 
increased imports.   
The president had the discretion to accept the proposed ITC remedy, impose other 
measures, or reject any remedy whatsoever.  This sparked an internal debate over 
appropriate action.
20  Yet the fact that the administration had initiated the case virtually 
                                                                                                                                                 
voluntary export restraints with Japan and the European Community, President Carter instituted the trigger 
price mechanism of product-specific price floors, Presidents Reagan and Bush signed voluntary restraint 
agreements with principal suppliers (Moore 1996). 
18  Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows the United States to impose temporary tariffs and quotas on 
imported goods if they are injuring a domestic industry.  (A similar provision – called safeguards - is 
written into the GATT as well.)  Under Section 201, the U.S. International Trade Commission starts an 
investigation to determine if goods are being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as 
to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a domestic industry producing a like 
or directly competitive product, it recommends to the President relief that would remedy the injury and 
facilitate industry adjustment to import competition. The President makes the final decision concerning 
whether to provide relief and the type and duration of relief, which usually take the form of tariffs that 
decline over a five year period.  Private firms or industry associations are allowed to invoke the statue and 
initiate the process. 
19 This would come back to haunt the agency when the decision was reviewed at the WTO. 
20 Drawing on his experience as the CEO of Alcoa, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill proposed an 
international agreement to reduce excess capacity in the world steel market, to essentially form a global 
steel cartel to manage production (Suskind 2004, 216ff).  Presidential adviser Karl Rove thought that steel 
protection might help swing Pennsylvania and Michigan to the Republican side in the 2002 mid-term   13
assured that it would accept the ITC’s verdict.  It would have been odd to have initiated a 
case and then to have rejected the proposed relief (although some in the administration 
believed that relief was provided only because TPA had not been secured).  In March 
2002 the president announced the final decision to accept the ITC recommendation and 
impose tariffs of up to 30 percent on selected categories of imported steel.   
  Although this action was in some sense cut from the same cloth as the steel trade 
restraints imposed by previous administrations, there was a key difference.  Previous 
administrations were not constrained by GATT rules and had negotiated voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) with foreign suppliers.  VERs enabled foreign exporters to earn quota 
rents, tempering their opposition to the export restriction.  Under the Uruguay Round 
agreements, however, countries could no longer negotiate VERs but instead had to use 
the existing trade remedies in the GATT, such as the escape clause.  By imposing tariffs, 
these instruments harmed foreign exporters instead of handing them quota rents; hence 
foreign countries were much more likely to oppose them.  Furthermore, a new and 
stronger dispute settlement system had been set up at the WTO to prosecute disputes over 
international trade rules.      
  Almost immediately the European Union, along with Japan, China, South Korea, 
Switzerland, and Norway, challenged the Bush steel action in the dispute settlement 
system in the WTO.  The EU threatened to retaliate even before the president announced 
                                                                                                                                                 
elections.  Prior to the meeting, according to Suskind, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan urged Vice President Cheney to reject steel tariffs on the grounds “that the 
largely bipartisan consensus on free trade was one of the great victories of the last decade; that the 
President would confuse many constituencies by flouting that consensus,” and that the action might violate 
WTO rules.  In February 2002, at a meeting in the White House situation room, the economic and 
diplomatic policy principals of the Bush administration met to make a final decision about the ITC ruling.  
According to Suskind (2004), Zoellick and Cheney favored imposing the safeguard action while most other 
participants were skeptical but not adamantly opposed.  (Zoellick believed that relief would help secure the 
passage of TPA in the Senate, which had yet to vote on the measure.)   14
his final decision.  In May 2003 a WTO panel found that the ITC decision was 
inconsistent in several ways with the WTO safeguard agreement, such as whether the 
surge in steel imports was unforeseen and whether imports had increased in absolute or 
relative terms (Read 2005).  Despite a U.S. appeal, the WTO Appellate Body essentially 
reaffirmed the panel’s decision.     
The administration then faced the choice of (a) rescinding the steel tariffs, (b) not 
changing its policy and tolerating retaliation against U.S. exports by the EU and others, 
or (c) offering compensation in the form of other tariff reductions.  In December 2003, 
Zoellick announced that the safeguard tariffs had achieved their purpose and would be 
lifted.  This decision was not difficult because the steel measures had received 
unfavorable press in the United States and around the world, had been in effect through 
the 2002 midterm elections and had thus served their political purpose, and had coincided 
with large increases in domestic steel prices (something that was only partly a result of 
the tariffs themselves), boosting the profitability of the industry.
21   
  A second retreat from the Bush administration’s stated principles of free trade and 
open markets was the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.  Congress enacts 
farm legislation every five years, and the Freedom to Farm Act of 1997 had resulted in 
lower farm subsidies and price supports.  But low commodity prices then prompted 
Congress to enact supplemental appropriations that restored farm benefits.  The Bush 
administration did not take an active part in proposing and crafting this legislation and 
consequently paid a price.  Congress formalized these informal supplements and the 
president signed the legislation in May 2002.  The failure to curtail farm subsidies 
                                                 
21 As the Financial Times noted, “More than any single action by the Bush administration, the steel tariffs 
sowed doubts around the world about whether the U.S. can do what it is asking of other countries – make 
politically difficult decisions at home to advance the prospects of free trade abroad.”  (December 5, 2003).     15
marked a retreat from the principles of the Freedom to Farm Act and was a bad omen for 
the Doha Round, one goal of which was to scale back agricultural subsidies.  The 
looming $40 billion annual support (budgetary and non-budgetary) for agriculture in the 
United States drew strong criticism from developing countries.  The problem for the 
administration was not so much its actions in this case (every president since the 1930s 
having signed bills giving subsidies to domestic farmers), but the clash with its strong 
free market, free trade rhetoric. 
A third retreat from free trade was the November 2005 memorandum of 
understanding between the United States and China establishing 21 quotas covering 34 
categories of U.S. imports of textiles and apparel products that had previously been 
subject to safeguard actions.  These quotas were reminiscent of the Multifiber 
Arrangement (MFA) abolished by the WTO in January 2005 but were implemented to 
slow the rapid growth in apparel imports from China in particular.  In March 2007 the 
Bush administration then signaled that China was no longer a “non-market” economy and 
hence that countervailing duty law (which allows the imposition of tariffs on subsidized 
imported goods) could be applied against its exports.  This decision, involving a case of 
imports of specialty paper products, was yet another indication that the administration’s 
trade policies were not more ideologically driven or substantively different from those of 
its predecessors. 
  To be sure, the Bush administration resisted other opportunities for backsliding.  
It supported the accession of China to the WTO, seeing through the abolition of the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, and resisted use of the Section 421 “China safeguard.”  
Although frequently criticized for rejecting multilateralism, the administration worked to   16
comply with the WTO dispute settlement rulings (the Foreign Sales 
Corporation/Extraterritorial Income Exclusion, the Byrd amendment, and steel safeguard 
cases in particular) and, of course, for having launched the Doha Round. 
  The principal way in which the Bush administration’s trade policy differed from 
its predecessors was in the use of bilateral agreements.  Given the obstacles to concluding 
a broad multilateral agreement at the WTO, in particular the ability of the slowest 
countries to block progress toward dismantling trade barriers and reducing subsidies, 
USTR Zoellick was not content to wait.  He therefore enunciated the doctrine of 
“competitive liberalization” – the United States would bypass the WTO and pursue 
bilateral and regional trade agreements as a way of putting pressure on reluctant 
reformers.
22    
The administration’s ambitious pursuit regional arrangements could have been 
anticipated once Zoellick was appointed USTR.  Even before the 2000 election, he had 
argued that:   
“If some regions are too slow to open their markets, the United States should 
move on to others.  America should spur a competitive dynamic for openness and 
transparency.  Competition can work wonders:  when the United States pursued 
NAFTA and APEC, the EU finally felt the pressure to complete the global 
Uruguay Round trade negotiations.  If other hold back in the new WTO round, the 
United States should repeat this strategy of regionalism with a global goal in order 
to break the logjam.”  
  
And in 2002, Zoellick (2002) explained:   
“We will promote free trade globally, regionally and bilaterally, while rebuilding 
support at home. By moving forward on multiple fronts, the United States can 
exert its leverage for openness, create a new competition in liberalization, target 
the needs of developing countries, and create a fresh political dynamic by putting 
free trade onto the offensive. . . . To multiply the likelihood of success, the United 
                                                 
22 The term “competitive liberalization” was first used by Fred Bergsten (1996) to describe the process of 
Asian trade liberalization during the early 1990s and was adopted by Zoellick as a description of his 
approach.   17
States is also invigorating a drive for regional and bilateral free-trade agreements 
(FTAs). These agreements can foster powerful links among commerce, economic 
reform, development, investment, security and free societies. . . . The United 
States is combining this building-block approach to free trade with a clear 
commitment to reducing global barriers to trade through the WTO. By using the 
leverage of the American economy's size and attractiveness to stimulate 
competition for openness, we will move the world closer toward the goal of 
comprehensive free trade.” 
 
Prior to the Bush administration the United States had signed just a few FTAs on 
an ad hoc basis: the U.S.-Israel FTA in 1985, the U.S.-Canada FTA in 1989, NAFTA in 
1993, and the U.S.-Jordan FTA in 2001 (signed by Bush but initiated by the Clinton 
administration).  Breaking with past practice, Zoellick now aggressively increased the 
number of bilateral negotiations, concluding agreements with Australia, Chile, Singapore, 
Peru, Morocco, Bahrain, South Korea, Colombia, Panama, and five Central American 
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
23  Additional 
negotiations were undertaken with five nations in southern Africa as well as with 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.   
More than just a domestic initiative, this strategy was also a response to foreign 
trends.  The global move toward bilateral and regional trade agreements predated the 
Bush administration.  The number of such agreements notified at the WTO by other 
countries accelerated in the early 1990s, around the time of NAFTA.  As Bush stated in 
his Miami campaign speech in 2000, he was aware that the United States was behind the 
curve and that U.S. exporters were beginning to suffer discriminatory treatment as a 
result of other countries’ FTAs.   
Economists tend to support the non-discriminatory most-favored nation principles 
of the GATT and WTO and believe that multilateral negotiations are the only way to deal 
                                                 
23 In what eventually became known as CAFTA-DR (Central American Free Trade Agreement and the 
Dominican Republic).   18
with the troublesome issue of agricultural and export subsidies.
24  Proponents of FTAs 
argue that they are a useful alternative when the multilateral option is not viable.  The 
FTA or “like-minded” country approach bypasses the hold-up problem at the WTO, is 
likely to create more trade than it diverts, and hence may put pressure on reluctant trade 
reformers.
25  At the same time, some trade policy analysts fear that the FTAs divert 
scarce negotiating resources away from the multilateral system. 
From the standpoint of domestic politics, FTAs have the problem of forcing the 
Congress to vote frequently on trade bills, which many members find unpalatable.  Some 
FTAs were uncontroversial and passed the Congress easily: the Australian FTA passed 
the House by a vote of 314 to 109, the Singapore FTA passed by 272 to 155, the 
Moroccan FTA by 323 to 99, and the Bahrain FTA went through by 327 to 95.  Others 
encountered stiff opposition and required much arm twisting to ensure their passage.  
CAFTA-DR raised the specter of the divisive NAFTA debate and squeaked through the 
House by a vote of 217 to 215 in July 2005, while the FTA with Oman passed the House 
by a vote of 221 to 205.  The partisan nature of these trade votes gave members of 
Congress an incentive to keep their position ambiguous until they obtained a political 
favor from the president in exchange for their vote.  Also, trade is an uncomfortable issue 
for Congress, and the more times it is forced to vote on such bills the worse the 
environment becomes for future trade legislation.    
The Democrats’ capture of the Congress in the 2006 midterm elections effectively 
spelled the end of the Bush trade agenda.  Many Democrats have been skeptical of 
                                                 
24 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1995) and Bhagwati (2008), among others, fear that bilateral agreements are 
more trade diverting than trade creating and harm the multilateral system by diminishing the importance of 
the most favored nation clause. 
25 See Evenett and Meier (2008) for an assessment of competitive liberalization.   19
measures to expand trade and have resisted FTAs, particularly with developing countries, 
which they believe should include stronger labor and environmental provisions if pursued 
at all.  In a bow to political reality, the Bush administration reached an agreement with 
Congressional Democrats in May 2007 to include labor and environmental provisions in 
future trade agreements.  As a result, the Peru FTA passed with greater bipartisan 
support, clearing the House in November 2007 by a vote of 285-132.   
TPA expired in June 2007 with little prospect of renewal for the remainder of 
Bush’s second term.  And the political environment has become so hostile to trade that 
even bipartisan compromises to move the trade agenda forward may impossible to reach.  
The trade agenda has become complicated by fears about offshoring American service 
jobs, growing concerns about income inequality and the distribution of the gains from 
globalization, and the large bilateral deficit with China.  All of these factors have 
prevented the Bush administration from accomplishing its ambitious goals set out in its 
first term. 
A final issue that the Bush administration confronted was the national security 
related aspects of foreign investment.  The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS) reviews foreign purchases of U.S. companies or operations 
to see if they create problems for national security.  While the Bush administration 
favored an open investment policy, foreign purchases of American companies became 
controversial during its tenure.  Several high-profile acquisitions, from China and 
countries in the Middle East (such as the UNOCAL acquisition by a state-owned Chinese 
firm and the Dubai ports deal) have floundered over concerns about foreign influence.    20
Furthermore, in late 2007 and early 2008, a number of state-owned investment 
companies (sovereign wealth funds) then purchased equity stakes in capital-strapped U.S. 
financial institutions.  While their capital injections were appreciated, reservations about 
their influence over the politically-sensitive financial sector – especially given that the 
foreign investor was a state-owned and often state-managed entity – were voiced.  All 
this suggests that the open U.S. investment regime may come under pressure in coming 
years as well.   
   
3.  Monetary and Financial Policies 
  In keeping with its free-market rhetoric, the Bush administration came to office 
skeptical of activist IMF intervention in emerging market financial crises, foreign 
exchange market intervention, and multilateral development assistance.  In the 2000 
campaign Bush made critical remarks about how the Clinton Administration had run to 
the rescue of crisis countries such as Mexico in 1995, Russia in 1997, and Asian 
countries in 1998.  Administration officials were suspicious of a European-led 
bureaucracy like the IMF.  They signaled that the Bush Administration would seek 
significant reforms of the multilaterals.   
The views of Bush’s economic team were informed by fears of moral hazard.  
Knowing that the IMF would come to the rescue with emergency financial assistance, 
governments in emerging markets adopted riskier policies or waited longer to adopt 
corrective measures, in this view, while investors lent indiscriminately.  When the crisis 
came, the IMF provided the government with funds to support its financial markets; in 
effect, official funds were used to purchase the bonds that investors sold, preventing the   21
market from collapsing but allowing investors to avoid significant losses.  Not only did 
multilateral rescues transfer resources to Wall Street investors from the American 
taxpayers funding the Fund (from American “plumbers and carpenters” in the phrase of 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill) – or, insofar as the IMF is ultimately paid back by the 
crisis country, from its own taxpayers to Wall Street – but market discipline was 
weakened.  This critique thus indicted multilateral rescues on both efficiency and equity 
grounds. 
  Specialists disagree about the extent of moral hazard.  Skeptics observe that 
neither foreign investors nor the crisis country escape scot free.
26  The crisis country 
suffers a recession, and investors still incur losses.  But the majority of the Meltzer 
Commission, constituted to investigate the operations of the IMF and World Bank during 
the Clinton Administration and which reported in 2000, evinced no such doubts.
27  And 
number of members of the Meltzer Commission had ties to the Bush Administration.
28 
  Secretary O’Neill and his undersecretary for international affairs John Taylor had 
complex views of the bailout question.  In a 1998 interview that gained notoriety once he 
was nominated as deputy secretary, Taylor echoed the views of his mentor George Shultz 
that the world would be better off without the IMF.  O’Neill was known not just for his 
“plumbers and carpenters” remark but also for the observation that the IMF was 
“associated with failure” and that its international rescues had been “too frequent.”
29  But 
                                                 
26 A good summary of the skeptical view is Mussa (2006). 
27 See the report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000). 
28 Meltzer hailed from O’Neill’s hometown of Pittsburgh and did academic work close to Taylor’s, having 
helped to publish one of his important papers.  Charles Calomiris was close to his Columbia University 
colleague and coauthor Glenn Hubbard.  For more on these connections see below. 
29 In full, the first remark went “as we in the finance ministries of the world talk glibly about billions of 
dollars of support for policies gone wrong, we need to remember that the money we are entrusted with 
came from pumbers and carpenters who sent 25 per cent of their $50,000 annual income to us for wise 
use.”  Cited in Blustein (2005), p.118.  The “associated with failure” remark is cited there as well.   22
O’Neill also praised the Clinton Administration’s 1995 bailout of Mexico in his 
confirmation hearings and believed that, if there was a problem, hard-working officials 
could solve it.
30  Taylor for his part was anxious to avoid precipitous action that might 
roil the markets.
31   
So if the problem with IMF rescues was investor moral hazard, O’Neill’s instinct 
was to find new ways of providing assistance that forced investors to take a haircut.  If 
the problem with scaling back IMF assistance was exciting the markets, Taylor’s instinct 
was to move gradually.  This was in contrast with the Council of Economic Advisers, 
which adopted a harder line on the need to scale back the frequency and magnitude of 
IMF programs.
32 
  The first real test of the administration’s approach to foreign monetary and 
financial affairs was the crisis in Argentina.
33  Argentina already had a program with the 
IMF, and when Bush took office it had already experienced three years of economic 
stagnation.
34  Argentine voters and bondholders were losing patience, raising the danger 
                                                 
30 Blustein (2005), p.173. 
31 The full text of his 1998 Bloomberg interview is itself indicative of this propensity.  Taylor (2007), 
p.101. 
32 Blustein (2005), p.145. 
33 The Argentine problem long predated the Bush Administration.  Seeking to put behind it a history of 
inflation and instability, the country had adopted a quasi-currency board in 1991.  But it displayed neither 
the fiscal discipline nor the labor market flexibility necessary for that regime to work smoothly.  Inflexible 
labor markets meant slow growth, and lack of fiscal discipline meant dependence on capital inflows and 
doubts about debt sustainability.  The Argentine authorities, of whom there were many over time, averred 
admirable intentions but warned that, owing to political constraints, reform would take time.  They 
therefore sought the IMF’s seal of approval in the form of a precautionary program that entailed monitoring 
but not, in the first instance, money.  The U.S. declared its support for this initiative in 1997.  As grow 
slowed and doubts about debt sustainability deepened, precaution gave way to money.  Again the U.S. 
assented.  Then, at the end of 2000, the program was beefed up to $14 billion, an extraordinary 500 per cent 
of Argentina’s quota in the IMF.  (In addition, there was $5 billion from the Interamerican Development 
Bank and the World Bank and $1 billion from the Spanish government.)  In both cases the Fund insisted on 
fiscal restraint and labor market reform but not modification of the exchange rate regime as conditions for 
lending.  Space does not permit a comprehensive account; for more detail see Mussa (2002). 
34 Reflecting domestic problems compounded by devaluation in neighboring Brazil.   23
that a political backlash and capital flight might topple both the government and the 
financial system. 
  This would have been a fine time for the IMF and U.S. government to insist that 
Argentina restructure its debts and put in place more flexible wage and exchange rate 
policies and to indicate that no further assistance would be forthcoming until these tasks 
were undertaken.  The country would have been forced to address the roots of its 
problem.
35  Investors would have learned that indiscriminate lending had costs.  Other 
countries would have been taught to watch their p’s and q’s.   
The golden opportunity was the summer of 2001, when the Argentine government 
leaked to the press the idea that the IMF would not only accelerate disbursal of the $1.25 
billion to be paid out at the end of the second quarter but also augment its program.  The 
IMF not typically being forced into additional lending by public announcements by the 
borrower, this would have been a fine time to pull the plug.   
But the State Department worried about the consequences of failing to support a 
fledgling South American democracy.
36  Taylor worried that an Argentine restructuring 
could undermine investor confidence in the external debts of other emerging markets and 
damage banks and investment funds.  O’Neill believed that money was leverage and that 
with sufficient leverage the U.S. could force reforms of Argentine policy.  Others in 
Treasury were more skeptical.  In the White House, Glenn Hubbard at the CEA and 
Lawrence Lindsey, head of the National Economic Council, were skeptical of 
                                                 
35 O’Neill’s comments suggest an awareness that domestic factors with a long history were, in large part, at 
the root of the problem.  “They’ve been off and on in trouble for 70 years or more.  They don’t have an 
export industry to speak of.  And they like it that way.”  Blustein (2005), p.174. 
36 There were also issues of comparable treatment.  Additional IMF support was provided for Brazil in the 
summer of 2001, which in turn made it more difficult to deny support to Argentina.  (A CEA memo 
lamenting this labeled it the “prodigal son effect”).  But difficult did not mean impossible: unlike 
Argentina, Brazil had shifted to a more rational exchange rate regime in early 1999 and moved in the 
direction of sustainable policies, justifying a differentiated response.   24
forbearance.  With the economists divided, the arguments of the State Department tipped 
the balance.  The U.S. agreed to disbursal of the $1.25 billion already committed subject 
to the Argentine government meeting performance criteria.  It agreed to consider 
augmenting the program by an additional $8 billion. 
   O’Neill was impressed by the contrast between how companies and countries 
addressed debt-sustainability problems.  Corporations could restructure under the 
protection of the bankruptcy court.  The burden was shared by the creditors, not even 
bondholders with seniority being immune.  Its finances having been reorganized, the 
enterprise could continue as a viable entity.  That there existed no analogous procedure 
for countries was, in this view, what forced the IMF to lend and created moral hazard.
37 
  The scheme eventually hatched in discussions between Taylor’s office and 
Argentine officials was that $3 billion of the $8 billion of new IMF credits extended to 
Argentina would be used for a market-based debt restructuring.  But how this plan would 
work was never specified.  Why earmarking $3 billion of IMF assistance for this purpose 
should have significantly changed creditors’ calculus was, in any case, unclear.  $3 
billion was a drop in the bucket gauged against Argentina’s $95 billion of debt to private 
creditors, especially when one recalls that the IMF’s $3 billion was not free money – 
Argentina would have to pay it back.  Nothing would be changed by simply replacing $3 
billion of private debt with $3 billion of official debt, which was the implication of using 
the earmarked funds to retire outstanding obligations.  And there was no obvious way of 
leveraging the earmarked funds.  Locking up more than a third of the IMF’s $8 billion in 
                                                 
37 O’Neill was not alone:  the analogy with Chapter 11 bankruptcy had been made in academic circles, and 
similar ideas had circulated within the Fund.  An early influential statement was Sachs (1994).  A 
comprehensive account of the prehistory is Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).  But O’Neill’s insistence on 
results made these abstract concepts very real.   25
this way only limited the liquidity of its assistance.  It diminished the credibility of the 
IMF program given that observers had not the slightest idea of the content of the $3 
billion restructuring-related initiative.
38 
  The one positive result of the initiative was that it heightened awareness of the 
difficulty of restructuring as an alternative to bailouts.  O’Neill raised the issue with 
Horst Koehler, the IMF’s managing director, and Koehler’s deputy, Anne Krueger, at a 
breakfast meeting on September 17
th.
39  This paved the way for Krueger to propose a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).
40  The SDRM was not an official 
IMF proposal; Kohler let Krueger run with the ball.  It was not a sovereign bankruptcy 
court, but it would have created an independent panel of experts, operating under IMF 
aegis, with the power to cram down settlement terms on creditors.
41  Ultimately it was not 
feasible, given the need for an international treaty to override conflicting provisions of 
national law and the negative reaction of financial markets. 
  The idea was not even favored by the Bush administration; rather, it was O’Neill 
going off on his own.  In a sense the SDRM represented everything that the Bush 
administration opposed: international entanglements overriding U.S. sovereignty and 
governments taking matters out of the hands of markets.
42  But O’Neill’s characteristic 
                                                 
38 Hubbard and Randall Kroszner at CEA and Ken Rogoff, the IMF’s chief economist and economic 
councilor, made these points at the time but failed to change the course of events. 
39 A conversation he recounted at a Senate hearing three days later. 
40 “We lack incentives,” Krueger observed in her November speech, “to help countries with unsustainable 
debts resolve them promptly and in an orderly way.  At present the only available mechanism requires the 
international community to bail out the private creditors.  It is high time this hole was filled.”  Krueger 
(2001), p.1. 
41 How much power the panel would have possessed and how directly it would have worked with the IMF 
varied as the proposal evolved; eventually the original SDRM proposal was superceded by a more modest 
SDRM II or SDRM-lite.  For a discussion of the successive versions, see Krueger (2002). 
42 Thus, Hubbard made a number of speeches critical of the SDRM which signaled the absence of broader 
support within the Administration for the SDRM initiative.  See footnote 36 below.  A possible exception 
was the foreign policy apparatus: just as State had favored financial assistance for Argentina, the National   26
insistence that competent individuals were surely capable of working out the problem 
could not be ignored.  John Taylor’s office set about studying options.   
One option was collective action clauses, British-style contractual provisions that 
eased restructuring by providing for a bondholders’ meeting at which a qualified majority 
could bind in a dissenting minority.  These had been advocated by academics since the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-5, although emerging market issuers been not been willing to risk 
adding such provisions to debt securities issued in New York – this not being the 
standard template for contracts in that market – for fear that doing so might send a signal 
that they were prepared to contemplate restructuring and auger higher borrowing costs.
43   
For Taylor, collective action clauses were a way of channeling his boss’ 
enthusiasm.  They were market friendly, did not entail a role for government, did not 
create new responsibilities for the IMF, and promised to reduce the pressure for bailouts 
by creating an alternative for dealing with debt problems.  They were a middle way 
between the SDRM and nothing.  O’Neill endorsed the approach in December.
44  
Treasury officials described its merits in February 2002 testimony to Congress.  Taylor 
rolled it out publicly in an April 2002 speech at the Institute for International 
Economics.
45   
                                                                                                                                                 
Security Council now sympathized with Krueger’s arguments for the SDRM, perhaps more so insofar as 
Krueger and Condaleeza Rice had been colleagues at Stanford. 
43 See Eichengreen and Portes (1995).  Legal practitioners had been aware of the case even earlier; see 
Buccheit (1990) and Macmillan (1995).  Proposals for such clauses featured in a G10 report in 1996 and a 
G22 report in 1998, but to little effect.  See G10 (1996) and G22 (1998).  Clinton’s Treasury brain trust had 
been aware of the debate but was unwilling to force the issue.  Presumably the Russia-LTCM crisis did not 
constitute a favorable backdrop. 
44 While not at the same time seeking to quash the SDRM; someone with his corporate background may 
have liked seeing competing teams working up competing plans (Gelpern and Gulati 2007). 
45 Here was a case where Treasury and CEA agreed; Hubbard also endorsed CACs in a 2002 speech critical 
of the SDRM (Hubbard 2002), while referring to them as a “Treasury proposal” as a way of suggesting that 
there was still the need for a more general market-oriented approach to restructuring.     27
For the better part of a year no emerging market issuer was willing to go first for 
fear that a bond with unconventional contractual provisions would require a liquidity 
premium and that issuing it would send a negative signal.  Treasury mounted a lobbying 
campaign.
46  Finally in February 2003 Mexico, whose geographical and intellectual 
proximity placed it on the receiving end of much U.S. lobbying, issued a $1 billion global 
bond with a 75 per cent amendment threshold in New York.  The market reception was 
positive, and the logjam broke: CACs quickly became the market norm. 
 Some commentators believe that the moral hazard associated with IMF bailouts 
has been significantly reduced as a result, while others suggest that only cosmetic 
progress has occurred.
47  The honest answer is that it is too early too tell.  Emerging 
markets enjoyed more than five years of exceptional liquidity after the Fed, concerned to 
head off deflation, cut interest rates in 2001.  That liquidity, combined with the robust 
growth of the global economy and strong commodity markets, meant that there were no 
more Mexican- or Argentine-style crises as of the time of writing.
48  When more do roll 
around, we will be better able to judge how much difference this initiative has made for 
ease of restructuring, pressure for bailouts, moral hazard and market discipline.  In any 
case, this approach, emphasizing legal and institutional reform, at least constituted a 
coherent alternative to the ad hoc approach that had the Administration criticize its 
predecessor’s support for IMF rescue packages but then support the extension of another 
                                                 
46 A blow-by-blow account is Gelpern and Gulati (2007).  John Snow had replaced O’Neill as secretary at 
the end of 2002, but this did not change the policy. 
47 Readers should be aware, if this is not obvious already, that one of the authors has a hound in this race 
(see Eichengreen 2003). 
48 There was, however, a subsequent restructuring by Belize of bonds featuring CACs.   28
the first time a serious crisis erupted.  If nothing else it signaled the administration’s 
commitment to a new strategy.
49 
What debt restructuring and Argentina were for the administration’s first two 
years, external imbalances were for the subsequent period.  The U.S. current account 
deficit rose from a bit over $400 billion in 2000 to roughly $800 billion in 2005, 
expanding to an unprecedented 6 per cent of U.S. GDP.  Explanations for the U.S. deficit 
included low U.S. savings, reflecting the 2001 tax cuts and the run-up first of high-tech 
stocks and then of real estate values (Roubini and Setser 2004); high U.S. investment, 
responding to the attractions of a flexible U.S. economy (Cooper 2004); high foreign 
saving, mainly in Asia, reflecting the underdevelopment of markets in consumer credit 
and social safety nets (Bernanke 2005); and depressed foreign investment, reflecting the 
slow pace at which East Asia recovered from their financial crisis (Rajan 2006).  In the 
view of U.S. politicians, however, there was no question that China was at the center of 
the equation.  China’s emergence was arguably the most dramatic and profoundly 
important international economic event of this period.  The Chinese economy was 
already 50 per cent larger in 2005 than in 2000; the country’s exports nearly doubled over 
the period. 
The Bush Treasury and the U.S. Trade Representative had to contend with the 
threat of protectionist sanctions, notably in the form of a bill by Senator Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) that, in the absence of an initiative to allow the renminbi to appreciate, would 
have slapped at 27.5 per cent tariff on imports from China.
50  The Nixon Administration 
had imposed a unilateral import surcharge in 1971, when the U.S. had similarly been in 
                                                 
49 This is the interpretation, in part, of Gelpern and Gulati (2007). 
50  27.5 per cent splitting the difference between alternative estimates of the extent of renminbi 
undervaluation known to Schumer’s people, which ranged from 20 to 35 per cent.   29
deficit vis-à-vis Japan and Europe.  But to now do the same to China would have cast 
doubt on the U.S. commitment to a rules-based World Trade Organization and 
jeopardized prospects for getting the Doha Round back on track (see above), not to 
mention risking Chinese cooperation on North Korea.   
To their credit, Secretary Snow and his colleagues instead urged China to allow 
more currency flexibility on the assumption that a flexible renminbi would appreciate, 
narrowing China’s bilateral surplus.  Treasury pressed the case for renminbi adjustment 
in public statements and private discussions with Chinese officials.  The Administration 
asked Schumer and the Congress to wait for it to produce results. 
For their part, the Chinese were reluctant to adjust their exchange rate, the 
maintenance of export-led growth depending in their view on a stable and competitively 
valued currency.  Social stability hinged on creating millions of additional jobs in urban 
manufacturing annually, something with which a sharp appreciation and sharp slowdown 
in export growth were not compatible.  In any case, simply revaluing the renminbi might 
have little effect on the U.S. deficit if other countries did not go along.   
Finally, it was not clear that American tactics were well designed for getting the 
Chinese to move.  U.S. officials pushed for free floating rather than offering to settle for a 
transitional revaluation.  They spoke of a “market-determined exchange rate,” reflecting 
uncertainty about the extent of the renminbi’s undervaluation and their preference for 
shunning intervention in foreign exchange markets.
51  But China, lacking deep and liquid 
markets and hedging instruments for banks and firms, was in no position to let its 
                                                 
51 This emphasis on “market-determined exchange rates” may have reflected the bias of noneconomists 
around Vice President Cheney, whose views were shaped more by ideology than economic analysis.    30
currency float freely.
52  The administration’s “market-determined exchange rate” rhetoric 
asked them to do the impossible.  Focusing on the renminbi exchange rate made little 
sense, moreover, insofar as what was needed was a package of policy changes (increased 
spending on infrastructure and public services, the development of financial markets and 
a social safety net, increased domestic demand to soften the impact of lower net exports, 
and more payment of dividends by state-owned enterprises) and parity adjustments not 
just by China but by a range of U.S. trading partners.
53  Nor was the U.S. in a position to 
offer anything in return other than avoiding punitive tariffs.   
There are explanations for why direct pressure produced little, other than Chinese 
statements of willingness to move to a more flexible exchange rate “eventually.” In early 
2005 the Administration switched tactics: from public pressure to quiet diplomacy; from 
an exclusive focus on the exchange rate to the need for a coordinated set of Chinese 
policy adjustments (developing financial markets and augmenting the social safety net); 
and from preoccupation with the bilateral relationship to encouraging China to become a 
responsible stakeholder in the multilateral institutions.
54  This was the culmination of a 
long journey for an administration that had come to office with attitudes that ranged from 
                                                 
52 Treasury offered technical assistance on the development of spot and futures markets, but this was not 
something that could be completed overnight.  Moreover, that many Chinese officials had their roots in 
central planning rendered them skeptical about the merits of a “market-determined” exchange rate.  Snow, 
in his summer 2003 visit, also emphasized the desirability of having China open its capital account.  Again, 
this was not something that the country was either able to do; given its state of financial development, this 
advice was at best beside the point, at worst dangerous.  It discredited the U.S. lobbying campaign. 
53  As laid out in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006). 
54 The switch in tactics was probably not unrelated to the succession of Snow and Tim Adams to the 
positions previously held by O’Neill and Taylor at Treasury.  The perceived need to do something new was 
also pointed up when the Senate voted in April by an overwhelming 67-33 to allow consideration of 
Schumer’s tariff bill if China did not revalue within six months.   31
distain to outright hostility toward the IMF and World Bank but now saw them as key 
mechanisms for advancing its foreign economic policies.
55 
Robert Zoellick invoked this responsible-stakeholder rhetoric both publicly and 
privately.  Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and William Rhodes were briefed by 
Treasury and carried the message to Beijing.  That aside from Rhodes (senior vice-
chairman of Citigroup) they were not financial specialists pointed to the fact that the 
administration sought to encourage China to assume more responsibility for the operation 
of the international system generally, and not just for the imbalances problem.   
Even from this narrowly financial perspective, the new approach paid dividends.  
The Chinese revalued by 2.1 per cent on July 21
st, 2005 and announced that henceforth 
the renminbi would be allowed to fluctuate more freely.  In practice, its movement was 
still tightly controlled by the People’s Bank, resulting in little further appreciation and 
explosive growth in China’s surplus through the first half of 2007.  Still, this could be 
advertised as a down payment.  The Schumer bill was tabled.  Snow’s successor Henry 
Paulson continued to press the Chinese for greater currency flexibility and appreciation.  
On his inaugural trip to China as treasury secretary in September 2006, Paulson met with 
the party secretary of fast-growing Zhenjang Province and dined with the central bank 
governor, himself a well-known proponent of flexibility.  Paulson thus sought to reframe 
the debate as not between the U.S. and China but between pro- and anti-liberalization 
forces in both countries. 
  To redirect attention away from the bilateral imbalance and encourage China to 
assume greater responsibility for the international system, the Bush administration 
                                                 
55 The history of strained relations did not make things easy: the U.S. tried and failed to get the IMF to 
conduct a special consultation with China over the exchange rate issue.  Such consultations have been 
conducted twice in the history of the Fund, with Sweden in 1982 and South Korea in 1987.   32
reluctantly embraced the IMF’s Multilateral Consultations Initiative, announced in the 
spring of 2006.  The idea was that, with the IMF providing projections and serving as 
honest broker and with Europe, Japan and Saudi Arabia also at the table, it was more 
likely that the major players could agree on a coordinated package of policy adjustments 
to smoothly unwind global imbalances.  The onus would not be on China alone to offset 
any compression of U.S. demand; with China, Europe, Japan and the oil exporters 
expanding demand simultaneously, there would be less need for sharp adjustments by 
any one economy.  This was also a way of cloaking U.S. demands in multilateral cloth 
and lending international legitimacy to the call for Chinese adjustment.  The IMF, and not 
the Treasury through its semi-annual report on international economic and exchange rate 
policies, would be responsible for determining whether the renminbi was being 
maintained at inappropriate levels.  There is an obvious parallel with the Bush 
administration’s initial reluctance to deal with Saddam Hussein through the United 
Nations but its subsequent efforts to enlist the organization in Iraq. 
The administration appreciated, however, that multilateral consultations were a 
two-edged sword.  Allowing the IMF to become adjudicator of exchange rates was fine 
and good except if the Fund concluded that the U.S. deficit was unsustainable and the 
dollar would have to fall.  Convening a multilateral consultation also raised the question 
of what the U.S. would bring to the table.
56  Other countries were unanimous in 
identifying low U.S. savings as contributing to the imbalances problem.  Raising taxes or 
even just sunsetting the Bush tax cuts of 2001-2 were obvious ways of encouraging 
public saving, but there was reluctance to do so on ideological and practical political 
                                                 
56 This is why the administration was less than enthusiastic about the multilateral consultation initiative and 
saw it as a pale response to its earlier request for a special consultation with China.   33
grounds.  Sharper increases in interest rates might encourage private saving, but this grew 
less attractive as the U.S. expansion entered its late stages and slow growth loomed.   
When the results of the first consultation were released in April 2007, they turned 
out to be weak soup.  The U.S. government acknowledged the desirability of cutting its 
budget deficit and raising household savings but without committing to specific policies.  
China similarly acknowledged the desirability of greater exchange rate flexibility, as it 
had in the past, without committing to any specific changes in policy. 
By early 2007 the trade-weighted value of the dollar had fallen by 17 per cent 
from early-2002 levels.
57  Demand had begun picking up in Europe and Japan, and there 
were signs that the U.S. deficit had peaked, leading the IMF to back off the issue.
58  But 
China had only allowed the renminbi to appreciate by a cumulative 7 per cent against the 
greenback, placing most of the burden on other countries that were forced to absorb the 
bulk of the adjustment and rendering them reluctant to do more.
59  Thus it was important 
for the soft-landing scenario that in early 2007 the Chinese authorities indicated a 
willingness to contemplate greater flexibility if the country’s external surplus continued 
                                                 
57 According to the Fed’s broad index.  That the BIS’s broad index had fallen by less reminds us that there 
is no one best way of definitively measuring effective exchange rates.  See Klau and Fung (2006). 
58 Observers continued to debate whether the rise in U.S. net exports would be sustained and thus whether 
the dollar had fallen enough to make a serious dent in the current account. 
59 Thus, Korea, whose currency appreciated sharply in 2005 and then by some 10 per cent against the dollar 
in the course of 2006, engaged in extensive intervention in an effort to stem the currency’s further rise.  
Thailand, having seen the baht rise by 17 per cent in the course of the year, tried a badly-received 
experiment with capital controls in December.  The European Trade Union Confederation referred to the 
“brutal” appreciation of the euro against the dollar.  These measures and statements are indicative of the 
reluctance other countries to allow their currencies to rise further against the dollar in the absence of 
Chinese willingness to do likewise.   34
to grow.
60  Precisely what this means and whether it will support a smooth unwinding of 
global imbalances remain to be seen.
61 
By 2004-5 there had thus developed an appreciation of the advantages of 
attempting to advance U.S. foreign monetary and financial interests through the IMF 
rather than relying exclusively on bilateral initiatives.
62  Working through the Fund 
depersonalized and depoliticized the international debate.  Of course, the IMF could be 
an agent of depoliticization only if its decisions were taken on the basis of clear rules and 
procedures rather than politics.  Hence the debate over CACs and the SDRM, which 
opened up alternatives to bailouts, was accompanied by measures to strengthen the 
application of IMF credit ceilings, which were traditionally limited to 300 per cent of 
quota.
63  Simultaneous with Mexico’s decision to issue bonds with collective action 
clauses in New York, the Fund’s executive directors agreed that, as a precondition for 
receiving exceptional access to IMF resources, countries would have to satisfy specific 
criteria related to debt sustainability and capital market access and that staff would have 
to submit an “exceptional access report” detailing conformance for the approval of the 
Executive Board. 
The administration further acknowledged that the U.S. could more effectively 
advance its interests in the Fund by boosting the representation of emerging markets.  
The institution would be seen a legitimate venue for policy debate and action only if 
rapidly growing countries were adequately represented in terms of quotas (which 
                                                 
60 See inter alia Bloomberg (2007). 
61 If it does, the administration’s approach of relying on words rather than deeds – avoiding both trade 
conflicts with China and measures that would have interfered with U.S. expansion – will have been 
vindicated. 
62 Again it is not hard to see an analogy with other forms of foreign policy and with the evolution of the 
Administration’s attitude toward the United Nations. 
63 Taylor (2007, p.106  et seq.) notes how his own views of the issue had been informed by academic 
research on monetary policy emphasizing the advantages of rules-based policies over discretion.   35
determined voting rights) and seats on the Executive Board.  The U.S. thus led the charge 
for governance reform at the Fund starting in 2004.
64   The summer of 2006 saw 
agreement on a 1.8 per cent quota increase for four underrepresented emerging markets – 
China, Korea, Turkey and Mexico – and on the principle of more comprehensive quota 
revision designed to reflect changes in the global economic landscape, to be completed 
by September 2008, in the course of which the U.S. quota would not be increased.
65 
This brings us to World Bank reform.   George W. Bush himself was no fan of 
assistance for poor countries, which he likened to welfare.  Secretary O’Neill insisted that 
the aid apparatus needed to be overhauled before being given more money.  The world 
had spent “trillions of dollars [on development] and there’s damn little to show for it,” he 
complained, implying that the Bank was inefficient and poorly run.
66  O’Neill 
complained that World Bank President James Wolfensohn had no second in command 
and that the institution lacked priorities.  It did not have adequate systems for assessing 
results.
67 
John Taylor writes how he was sympathetic to the goal of poverty reduction and 
how, like O’Neill, he pushed for more measurement of results.
68  He urged the Bank to 
focus on its core competency, namely measures for reducing poverty in the poorest 
                                                 
64 The more cynical would observe that the increase in seats and voting shares for emerging markets would 
come at the expense of Europe, not the United States, which would never lose its 15 per cent voting share 
and de facto veto over important policy decisions (which require a 85 per cent supermajority). 
65 This was a turnaround for an administration initially hostile to the Fund – again demonstrating how 
deeply locked in the existing institutional framework is and how to continues to condition U.S. policy.  At 
the same time it can be argued that the opportunity for more comprehensive IMF reform was inadequately 
exploited.  In particular, the U.S. did not insist on reform of leadership selection, allowing the Europeans to 
nominate Rodrigo de Rato as Kohler’s successor – since the Administration did not want to lose its 
traditional prerogative of nominating the president of the World Bank, something that has since been 
shown to be something of a poisoned chalice (see below).   
66 Mallaby (2004), p.289 
67 Anyone familiar with the Bank can appreciate his frustration.  But one wonders whether this 
organization, with its noble charge, was being held to higher standards than other government agencies. 
68 Taylor (2007), chapter 5.   36
countries, and to graduate middle-income countries like Brazil and Turkey with access to 
international capital markets.  He pushed for grants over loans to avoid burdening poor 
countries with more debt-servicing obligations.
69  Eventually Taylor concluded in favor 
of forgiving the debts of the poorest countries.
70 
Bush rolled out his plan for replacing loans with grants prior to the G8 Summit in 
Genoa in July 2001.  The result was a tug of war between the administration on one side 
and its European counterparts and Bank staff on the other, which suspected the 
administration of using these proposals as cover for scaling back the Bank.  The 
Europeans opposed graduating middle-income countries, since this meant limiting Bank 
involvement in many parts of the world.  They opposed shifting from loans to grants 
since there would be no money for new loans unless previous recipients paid back what 
they had borrowed. 
At this point 9/11 intervened.  Soon after attacks on the World Trade Center, 
World Bank President Wolfensen began emphasizing the contribution of the Bank’s 
antipoverty mission to the administration’s war on terror.  He spoke with NSC chair Rice 
and ramped up Bank missions in the region around Afghanistan.  O’Neill resisted calls 
from Britain and suggestions from Wolfensohn for backing these initiatives with 
increased aid, insisting that the Bank must first demonstrate that it could put more money 
to good use.   
                                                 
69 To the extent that the reflow of interest from earlier loans allowed the Bank to lend more, he argued that 
it was simply double counting the transfers made to poor countries – adding new loans to its list of 
achievements without subtracting the repayments. 
70 In formulating this agenda Taylor was influenced by the Meltzer Commission, which had considered  
World Bank as well as IMF reform.   Its report had called for curtailing bank operations in middle-income 
countries and for replacing loans with grants; Meltzer knew both O’Neill and Taylor, as noted above, and 
once had an office on the same corridor as Lindsay and Hubbard at the American Enterprise Institute.  
Taylor cites the Meltzer report in his book when discussing the need for World Bank reform.  Taylor 
(2007), p.135.   37
But O’Neill’s influence was in decline, and the argument that foreign aid was 
more than an act of altruism was compelling in the wake of 9/11.
71  In the spring of 2002, 
the Bush administration performed a U-turn.  At the Monterrey summit it promised an 
extra $5 billion in aid over three years (later changed to an extra $5 billion a year, 
indefinitely).  Evidently Wolfensohn’s line that Bank assistance was critical to the war on 
terror trumped O’Neill’s skepticism.  This was the origin of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), an Administration initiative to tilt aid toward countries that met 16 
benchmarks of good governance and policy.   
The problem was finding countries and projects that satisfied these conditions.  It 
was as if lending would be limited to countries that had removed the fundamental 
obstacles to growth and development – thereby rendering development assistance 
redundant.
72  The principle that only countries with reasonably strong controls and 
policies can make productive use of additional grants in aid may be appealing, but the 
result has been to limit disbursements to a trickle.  Other initiatives have produced greater 
results: these include the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa (Pepfar) and more 
attention to problems like malaria. 
  Nor was the war on terror an unmitigated blessing for the World Bank.  In the 
summer of 2003, the U.S. pushed Wolfensohn and the Bank to lend to Iraq.  Snow called 
for this publicly.  Taylor telephoned to request that the Bank pledge billions in loans to 
Iraq’s budget.  Wolfensohn objected that there was no government that had been 
recognized by a UN resolution to which to lend.  It is hard to see how this initiative could 
                                                 
71 This idea was explicitly incorporated into successive national Security Strategies.  It was also the 
motivation behind Secretary Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” push. 
72 The Administration addressed this by creating Threshold Program Agreements, or contracts between the 
U.S. government and a country that provide for financial assistance to help improve a low score one one of 
the MCC’s 16 policy indicators.   38
have avoided undermining the administration’s emphasis on lending only to countries 
with efficient governments.
73 
  It was against this background that the nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to the 
presidency of the Bank was so controversial.  As Bush’s former deputy defense secretary, 
Wolfowitz was associated with the administration’s war on terror.  Anti-poverty and 
environmental groups criticized nomination of a figure who they feared would use the 
Bank to advance U.S. foreign policy.  On taking office, Wolfowitz incited controversy 
for his campaign against corruption and graft.
74   The campaign was certainly consistent 
with earlier administration criticism of the Bank: Secretary O’Neill had pointed to these 
and other problems when criticizing the Bank’s inefficiency, and control of corruption 
had been one of the 16 indicators enumerated by the Millennium Challenge Corporation.  
Wolfensohn, for his part, had already highlighted the corruption issue during his tenure.  
But it became controversial once Wolfowitz charged Americans with Republican Party 
ties with heading up the program and failed to develop an open process and transparent 
criteria.  Bank staff referred to an atmosphere of suspicion and criticized program 
administrators for their failure to consult.
75  South Africa complained that the anti-
corruption agenda threatened to compromise the Bank’s key mission of poverty 
reduction.  Once this spat went public, the Development Committee (of governmental 
overseers of the Bank) insisted on revisions in the anti-corruption paper.
76 
                                                 
73 In any case, two weeks later the issue was rendered moot by the car bombing of the UN’s Bagdad 
headquarters, including the World Bank’s offices.  The Bank then understandably withdrew its staff. 
74 “Bribes, kickbacks, manipulation of the contracting process, fraudulent procurement.” 
75 See Balls and Alden (2006). 
76 The DC endorsed the revised paper at its meeting in Singapore in September 2006 but insisted on yet 
further revisions, to be delivered in the spring of 2007.   39
If the goal was to normalize the operations of the Bank and put the turbulence and 
personalization of policy characteristic of the Wolfensohn years behind it, then it cannot 
be said that this objective was achieved.  Nor did the administration succeed in 
cultivating the support of other governments for its reforms: both the Europeans and 
developing countries resisted its proposals out of suspicion of its motives.   
That said, there were achievements.  The Bank strengthened its systems to 
measure the results of its programs.  European opposition to substituting grants for loans 
was partially overcome.
77  There was agreement on the U.S. proposal to forgive the IDA 
debt of the poorest countries over initial European objections that this would further limit 
World Bank resources.  To make this palatable the Administration agreed to increase its 
funding for IDA and tabled its proposal to graduate middle income countries. 
 
4.  Legacy for the Next Administration 
Given how U.S. foreign economic policy is constrained by interests and 
structures, the broad ambitions of the early Bush administration soon ran against 
formidable obstacles.  We suspect that the options available to the next administration 
will be similarly limited.  Like its predecessors, the next administration will confront 
WTO ministerial meetings on a two-year cycle, farm bills on five-year cycle, pressure 
from industry for more vigorous trade law enforcement, and the battle to renew its 
negotiating authority.  Although it will have some latitude in responding, it will have to 
respect existing U.S. government positions on these issues. 
                                                 
77 The decision that 21 per cent of IDA funds would be used for grants was a compromise between 
European insistence of using no more than 10 per cent of Bank resources in this way and the 
administration’s opening bid of 50 per cent.   40
The next administration will also inherit unresolved issues, including the loss of 
trade promotion authority and the fate of the Doha round.  Bush administration officials 
were powerless to produce an early harvest from Doha without a willingness on the part 
of the European Union to compromise on its agricultural subsidies and on the part of 
India and Brazil to agree on market opening.  With a WTO of more than 150 countries 
divided, reaching an agreement will remain difficult.  Moving quickly is not a hallmark 
of international trade negotiations.
78 
Equally important will be the increasingly sour domestic political environment for 
trade.  A constellation of factors portends a long pause in activist U.S. trade policies.
79  
The incoming president is likely to lack trade promotion authority.  Although trade 
negotiations can conceivably take place even if the president does not have such 
authority, U.S. negotiators will lack credibility with their foreign counterparts.  The next 
administration will almost certainly want trade promotion authority, so the question is 
whether Congress can be persuaded to go along, and if so on what terms such authority 
will be granted.  Congress has become hostile to pro-trade measures: the trade agenda has 
been complicated by fears about offshoring of American service jobs, growing concerns 
about income inequality and the distribution of the gains from globalization, and the large 
bilateral deficit with China.   
                                                 
78 The Kennedy Round of the GATT took four years (1964-67) to complete, while the Tokyo Round took 
six years (1973-1979) and the Uruguay Round took seven years (1986-1993).  The Doha Round is on track 
to break these records. 
79  Even if an internationalist Democrat such as Bill Clinton succeeds in taking the White House, economic 
nationalism is rampant among Congressional Democrats, potentially blocking any action on trade.  Such 
Democratic divisions are not be new; the Roosevelt administration was deeply divided between liberal 
internationalists such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other economic nationalist New Dealers who 
thought trade liberalization would undermine domestic price supports and other measures to regain full 
employment.  Hull battled long and hard to ensure his views became established administration policy.   41
An unfortunate characteristic of the Bush years has been sharply divisive, partisan 
Congressional votes on TPA and various FTAs.  The Bush administration did not 
cultivate a consensus for open trade but sought to push through trade legislation by force.  
A domestic consensus might be restored with greater social insurance measures to help 
those adversely affected by imports or by coupling trade agreements with stronger labor 
and environmental provisions, as Democrats propose.
80  The catch is that a move by 
Congress to require meaningful labor and environmental standards in trade agreements 
will be greeted with suspicion by developing countries.  They have resented Western 
demands for such standards in the past, viewing such requirements as providing an 
additional avenue for the United States and other advanced countries to close their 
markets.     
Pushing new trade initiatives requires a president to spend political capital.  There 
may be opportunities for achieving long-standing U.S. goals:  recent high commodity 
prices could open the door to the reform of agricultural subsidies, and U.S. trade barriers 
are now at such low levels that trade agreements involve much more opening for U.S. 
exporters than exposure of domestic industries to new foreign competition.   
However, if such initiatives encounter domestic resistance and lack a compelling 
foreign policy rationale, trade could easily be put on the back burner. All this portends a 
pause in activist U.S. trade policies geared toward trade liberalization.  At best this would 
mean the status quo remains intact.  Continued drift in or even collapse of the Doha 
round could mean a missed opportunity but perhaps nothing more.  The next 
administration may well encounter stiffer domestic opposition to trade-expanding actions 
                                                 
80 As well as others; see the proposal by Scheve and Slaughter (2007).  Slaughter served as a Member of 
Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers.   42
but is unlikely to seek to withdraw from the WTO.  The rules and procedures of the WTO 
will therefore continue to constrain domestic trade policy.   
The greater risk is that past gains from liberalization will get whittled away.  If the 
political climate for trade liberalization deteriorates further, with greater domestic income 
inequality and job losses linked in the public mind to factors emanating from the world 
economy, Congress may be tempted to enact anti-trade legislation.  And if such 
legislation seriously violated America’s commitments under the WTO, the United States 
could not only face retaliation from abroad but spawn a weakening of WTO 
commitments by other countries, leading to a general unraveling of the multilateral 
system.  Although a full-blown trade war is unlikely, a gradual breakdown of WTO 
disciplines would take many years to repair and could have significant negative 
consequences for the United States.  The next president may end up playing a defensive 
trade policy against Congress rather than pursuing an offensive trade policy with other 
countries. 
America’s large current account deficit and dependence on foreign central banks 
and governments for finance are continuing sources of vulnerability.  The fact that much 
U.S. foreign finance is provided by central banks and governments of countries like 
China and Saudi Arabia means that anything that upsets U.S. foreign relations could 
upset the U.S. economy and gives other governments a lever with which to influence U.S. 
policy.  Imagine a conflict over Taiwan or over U.S. policy in the Middle East.  If China 
or Saudi Arabia curtails its accumulation of dollars and alters the composition of its 
reserve portfolio, the dollar will fall sharply and the U.S. current account deficit will have   43
to be compressed.
81  This is not to argue that American foreign policy will be dictated by 
foreign financial leverage but to suggest that this dependence will complicate the foreign 
policy of the next administration. 
In addition, a chronically weak currency would encourage foreign central banks, 
governments and corporations to consider alternatives to the dollar as a medium in which 
to hold reserves, price petroleum and invoice trade.  Estimates of the value to the United 
States of the dollar’s international currency status vary, but the country clearly will be 
worse off when that status is no more. 
Following the 2004 presidential election, with the economy expanding strongly, 
there was an opportunity to address these vulnerabilities by pursuing revenue 
enhancement.  Now that the macroeconomic cycle is turning, there is no longer scope for 
tax increases; to the contrary there is every expectation that automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary tax cuts will again widen the deficit.  The next administration will inherit a 
mandate to provide universal health care and reform the Alternative Minimum Tax and 
face other familiar spending pressures.  Winding down U.S. involvement in Iraq will 
create fiscal savings, but the pressures of military and homeland security-related spending 
will remain intense.  The window for proactive adjustment having closed, the next 
administration will to pray that foreign finance for the U.S. current account continues to 
flow while the dollar declines smoothly, crowding in exports, and that the absence of 
capital gains on housing encourages more saving by American households.  Crossing 
one’s fingers and hoping for the best is not an attractive position, but such is the 
inheritance. 
                                                 
81 Conceivably as the result of a recession.  The mechanism would be imported inflation leading to higher 
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An orderly adjustment that limits U.S. external vulnerabilities would be facilitated 
by rebalancing demand in Asia.  If U.S. spending must decline relative to U.S. output, 
Asian spending will have to rise relative to Asian output if there is any hope of avoiding a 
negative shock to global growth.  China-bashing is unlikely to produce the desired 
changes; a continuation of the Paulson strategy of gently encouraging reformist interests 
in the country has greater prospects of success.  There may also be some scope for 
playing “good cop, bad cop” by warning that if China fails to reduce dependence on 
exports and stimulate domestic demand it may prove impossible to contain protectionist 
sentiment in Congress.
82  That said, the effectiveness of U.S. pressure for Chinese policy 
adjustments will be limited by what Lawrence Summers has dubbed “the balance of 
financial terror.”  China can always push back by hinting that it might sell U.S. treasury 
bonds or even just slow their rate of accumulation.   
This suggests that pressure for policy adjustments in China can be more 
effectively applied by a coalition of like-minded countries, perhaps through the IMF.  
The Bush Administration came to office suspicious of the IMF and World Bank and 
sought to address economic and financial issues with other countries through bilateral 
channels.  Economic relations with China, not unlike U.S. experience in Iraq, then 
demonstrated the limits of going it alone.  This led to efforts to address the China 
problem not only bilaterally but also through the IMF’s Multilateral Consultations 
Initiative and by encouraging the adoption of a new surveillance decision enhancing the 
powers of the Fund to identify misaligned exchange rates.  It led the Bush Treasury to 
accept a modest reduction in the U.S. quota share as its contribution to the reforms 
                                                 
82 Of course, a president who had campaigned in favor of anti-China trade measures could not credibly 
adopt this posture.   45
designed to enhance the legitimacy of the institution.  It led to agreement on the 
Monterrey Consensus.  The next administration will almost certainly continue down this 
road. 
But American relations with the Bretton Woods institutions, like the country’s 
relationship to the United Nations, remain uneasy.  The next administration will still have 
more fences to mend in the wake of the Wolfowitz affair at the World Bank.  Here the 
decision to nominate Robert Zoellick to replace Wolfowitz, however qualified the 
candidate, was an opportunity lost.  By insisting on its historical privilege to nominate the 
president of the World Bank, the Bush Administration did nothing to enhance the 
legitimacy of the institution among emerging markets.  It encouraged the Europeans to 
insist that sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander and that they had the right to 
nominate the successor to Rodrigo de Rato as managing director of the IMF.  The idea 
that the United States can work through these institutions to advance global economic 
prosperity and stability, and not incidentally its own foreign economic policy, presumes 
that these institutions are taken seriously elsewhere in the world.
83  An illegitimate 
leadership selection process undermines this presumption.  Why should China accept the 
IMF as umpire for exchange rates when it has no say in the appointment of that 
institution’s director?  A simple and effective initiative for the next administration would 
thus be to announce on taking office that it would not seek to nominate Zoellick’s 
successor when his term expires and that it expected analogous concessions of Europe. 
  
5.  Conclusions 
                                                 
83 U.S. support for quota increases for egregiously underrepresented emerging markets and Treasury’s 
commitment that the U.S. would not demand a quota increase itself as part of this process can be seen 
recognition of this fact.   46
Our analysis of the Bush administration’s international economic polices stresses 
continuities rather than breaks with its predecessors.  In trade policy the administration 
sought to push a free trade agenda but found it difficult to avoid compromises – just like 
its predecessors.  In financial policy the administration foreswore bailouts of financially-
distressed developing countries but ultimately yielded to the perceived necessity of 
lending assistance – just like its predecessors.  It came to office hostile to the extension of 
foreign aid but ultimately offered a new aid initiative – just like many of its predecessors.     
  We see the next administration grappling with the same problems under 
analogous political and policy constraints.  Its challenges will be broadly similar to those 
that faced the newly installed Bush administration: deadlock at the WTO, EU resistance 
to agricultural reform, Chinese trade tensions, the risk of a disorderly unwinding of the 
U.S. current account deficit, and ongoing World Bank and IMF reform.   
  While the nature of U.S. interests and the structure of international institutions 
and U.S. policy making suggest that there will be broad policy continuities, some issues 
will undoubtedly have a partisan flavor.  The ability of future administrations to pursue 
free trade agreements will almost certainly be more limited.   
  But partisan differences notwithstanding, we still expect continuity to be the rule.  
The institutions and interests in which the policy-making process is embedded shape 
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